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SYMPOSIUM
VALUES, QUESTIONS, AND METHODS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INTRODUCTION
JEREMY N. SHEFF†
Intellectual property (“IP”) scholarship has a unique
distinction among legal academic disciplines: some of its
practitioners question whether the subject of their study ought to
exist. We should pause to consider how remarkable this is.
Constitutional law scholars usually do not question whether
political communities should be governed by constitutions.
Criminal law scholars generally accept that the state ought to be
able to define and punish crimes. Contract law scholars do not
question that some promises should be enforceable in court. To
be sure, in each of these disciplines there are hotly debated
questions over the appropriate scope and justification for
particular legal rules, and that is true for IP as well. But
perhaps the central theoretical question in IP debates—and
particularly patent debates—is whether IP rights should exist at
all, or whether we would be better served by some other system
for regulating the creation and distribution of knowledge.1
This skepticism has a long pedigree in American IP law. In
patent law, it encompasses Thomas Jefferson’s musings on how
societies could reasonably disagree about whether patents
“produce more embarrassment than advantage,”2 and Fritz
Machlup’s ambivalent quip:

†
Professor of Law; Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, St. John’s
University School of Law.
1
See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 304–05 (2013) (reviewing the literature).
2
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813).
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If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of our present knowledge of its economic
consequences, to recommend instituting one[, b]ut since we
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to
recommend abolishing it.3

America’s history of copyright law is less ambivalent but more
checkered. In the nineteenth century, America was a pirate
nation, protecting the few works produced by its own citizens but
refusing to grant copyrights over the far larger and more highly
demanded body of works of authorship produced overseas. Now
that we have become a net exporter of copyrightable works, we
have also become a net exporter of rightholder-favoring copyright
laws,
embedding
protective
Western—and
particularly
American—standards into international legal instruments such
as TRIPS and bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.4
Our ambivalence about the very existence of IP rights
suggests an unsteady normative foundation for those rights. The
normative justifications offered for IP law have traditionally
taken two forms in the American academic literature. There are
consequentialist justifications, which hold that IP rights exist to
avoid the free-riding problems that attend production of
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable “public goods,” such as
inventions and works of authorship. Under this view, a limited
period of exclusivity gives creators a window to engage in
supracompetitive monopoly pricing, allowing them to recoup
their investment of time, effort and resources in production of
intangible resources that are costly to create but cheap to copy.5
3
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (review written by Fritz Machlup).
4
For a discussion on the history of American copyright and the relationship
between levels of cultural production and levels of copyright protection, see generally
B. Zorina Khan, Does Copyright Piracy Pay? The Effects of US International
Copyright Laws on the Market for Books, 1790-1920 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10271, 2004). For a discussion on the extension of U.S. copyright
law to developing countries through trade agreements, see Carsten Fink & Patrick
Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: Intellectual Property Provisions of U.S. Free
Trade Agreements, in TRADE, DOHA, AND DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW INTO THE
ISSUES 285, 295–96 (Richard Newfarmer ed., 2006).
5
See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (1962); Richard A. Posner, Intellectual
Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57 (2005).
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Then there are deontological justifications, principally drawing
on the labor-desert theories of John Locke, which hold that the
labor undertaken in creating a new invention or work of
authorship endows the creator with a moral claim to be
compensated for—and to control—its use.6 In recent decades,
these justifications have been examined using new methods, as
IP law scholarship has taken what might be called an “empirical
turn.”7
One line of scholarship in this vein purports to test a
fundamental premise of the consequentialist justification for IP
laws: they incentivize people to create new inventions and works
of authorship. We may call this premise the “incentive thesis.”8
Much of the new empirical evidence suggests that in some
circumstances, for some purposes, the incentive thesis is false.
For example, the innovative experiments reported by our
panelists Chris Buccafusco, Jeanne Fromer, and Chris Sprigman
demonstrate that small pecuniary incentives do not correlate
positively with creative or innovative activity or outputs in
discrete short-term tasks.9 Of course, other empirical work is
consistent with the theory that for works that require a
significant and long-term investment of effort or resources—such
as classical operas—the incentives provided by IP rights do, in
fact, increase production.10 Thus the empirical data, as a whole,

6
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the
Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005); Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
7
See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The
Role of Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
667, 669–70 nn.9–10 (2002).
8
The turn of phrase is borrowed from Professor Jonathan Barnett. See, e.g.,
Jonathan M. Barnett, Do Patents Matter? Empirical Evidence on the Incentive
Thesis, in HANDBOOK ON LAW, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 178 (Robert E. Litan ed.,
2011); Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on
Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV.
1381, 1381–82 (2005).
9
St. John’s Intellectual Property Law Center, St. John’s IPLC 2016 Symposium
| Panel 3: Methods, YOUTUBE (Nov. 15, 2016), https://youtu.be/ud6D9kEFsnI
[hereinafter “Panel 3”].
10
See generally Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyright and Creativity:
Evidence from Italian Operas (Oct. 19, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2505776).
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suggests that the incentive thesis is not categorically true or
categorically false across all the areas of human endeavor on
which IP law has purchase.
A second line of empirical scholarship attempts to quantify
the costs of IP rights. Such research typically focuses on the
most readily measurable aspect of those costs: litigation costs.
Again, empirical researchers dispute the magnitude of those
costs, and even the proper basis for measurement.11 Other
components of the costs of IP law—such as the deadweight losses
that result from excluding people from access to goods and
services covered by IP rights based on their ability and
willingness to pay, and the loss of follow-on contributions that
could have been made by those so excluded—appear frequently in
theoretical discussions but are much harder to get a handle on
empirically.12
Yet, a third line of empirical scholarship attempts to
determine whether IP rights are necessary to generate
innovative and creative activity.13 The key theme in this line of
research is identification of industries and fields of endeavor
where creativity and innovation emerge without any IP rights.14
Underlying this inquiry is the theoretical argument that other
legal regimes—prizes, government sponsorship, or a laissez-faire
approach—can provide satisfactory or even preferable substitutes
for IP rights.15
In a recent lecture, one of our panelists, Mark Lemley,
reviewed the body of current empirical scholarship along these
lines and concluded that the evidence in support of the
11
Compare JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 120–46 (2008), with
David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in
the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014).
12
See Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 891, 950 (2012) (“The challenge that has always confronted those who
have attempted to link copyright enforcement with lost innovation involves the
difficulty of tracing exactly what we have lost. One cannot pinpoint with certainty
technologies that would have developed if history had followed a different course.”).
13
This is to be distinguished from the first line of research, which attempts to
determine whether such incentives are sufficient to generate creative or innovative
activity.
14
See generally, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE
KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012).
15
See generally Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property:
When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY
51, 52–53 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002).
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consequentialist justification for IP law is “decidedly
ambiguous.”16 He notes that while earlier ambivalence about
consequentialist justifications for IP could have been based on
ignorance, we now have enough evidence to conclude that IP
“probably [is]n’t helping much, or [i]s only helping people in a few
specialized areas, and might in fact be making things worse.”17
In Professor Lemley’s view, this ambiguity suggests that recent
expansionist trends in IP law have been a mistake, and that even
maintaining current levels of IP protection ought to be
reconsidered.18
The failure of empirical evidence to support consequentialist
justifications for IP has also been noted by another of our
panelists, Rob Merges.19 But Professor Merges’s response to the
indeterminacy of empirical assessment of IP laws has been to
investigate other justifications for intellectual property—
alternatives drawn from deontological philosophical authorities
such as Locke, Kant, and Rawls.20 These two leading lights of
the IP academy have sparred in print over the implications of the
move away from consequentialism—Lemley deriding appeals to
deontological reasoning as “faith-based,” and Merges defending
his approach—in this Symposium Issue—as “pluralist” insofar as
it accommodates both consequences and abstract moral claims.21
In print, each of these authors has accused the other of closing
his mind to arguments inconsistent with their approach to the
problem, but in person, at our Symposium, we managed to have a
collegial discussion, revealing much common ground.22 I suspect
this is because their disagreement over the implications of recent
empirical scholarship on IP is not, in fact, as profound as it might
appear, and that the real issue is a much more serious challenge

16
Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328,
1334 (2015).
17
Id. at 1334–35.
18
Id.
19
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2–3 (2011).
20
See id. at x.
21
Robert P. Merges, Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
681 (2016).
22
St. John’s Intellectual Property Law Center, St. John’s IPLC 2016
(Nov.
14,
2016),
Symposium
|
Panel
1:
Values,
YOUTUBE
https://youtu.be/FENnzTkGUkw.
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to the work of legal scholars who study IP. This Introduction
discusses why I think that is the case, and where I think we
ought to go from here.
We might begin by asking why we think the types of
empirical research discussed above are useful. Professor Lemley
suggests that he views empirical scholarship as part of a
Popperian scientific process in which theories of how the world
works are tested for resistance to falsification.23 But if this is our
model, the epistemic humility of Popper’s theory of science must
be borne in mind: Popper explicitly abandoned any notion of
scientific truth.24 In other words, Popperian science cannot tell
us what is true; the best it can do is tell us which of two
competing stories is less plausible. It is worth remembering
what Popper himself had to say about this:
Scientific theories can never be “justified”, or verified. But in
spite of this, a hypothesis A can under certain circumstances
achieve more than a hypothesis B—perhaps because B is
contradicted by certain results of observations, and therefore
“falsified” by them, whereas A is not falsified . . . . The best we
can say of a hypothesis is that up to now it has been able to
show its worth, and that it has been more successful than other
hypotheses although, in principle, it can never be justified,
verified, or even shown to be probable.25

If this is our standard, then specifying our theories becomes
a problem of crucial importance. For example, what exactly is
the consequentialist justification that we might be trying to
falsify?
One possibility is the incentive thesis itself: the
hypothesis that, all else being equal, promising a property right
over the fruits of creative or innovative activity will induce
individuals to undertake and complete such activity more
frequently than they otherwise would. On this point, Professor
Lemley is clearly right to claim that the evidence is “decidedly
ambiguous” as to a context-independent version of the incentive
thesis, and less ambiguous—though less consistent—when we
begin specifying particular types of creative or innovative
activities or particular types of incentives.
23

Lemley, supra note 16, at 1346 n.67.
This is particularly so for the elusive truth by induction that has haunted
empiricist epistemology at least since Hume: Popper literally claimed “there is no
such thing as induction.” KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 18
(Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005).
25
Id. at 317.
24
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But we must remember that the incentive thesis is not in
itself a justification for IP rights; it is just one piece of the
argument. The ultimate question in consequentialist normative
assessments of policy is whether the policy has a positive effect
on outcomes compared to some baseline alternative policy. In
most consequentialist approaches, the outcome of interest is
some version of aggregate social welfare, and the means for
assessing it is some form of cost-benefit analysis. Within this
welfarist normative framework, the attractiveness of attempting
to falsify the incentive thesis is understandable: if the incentive
thesis were always and everywhere false, and the creation of new
inventions and works of authorship were the only benefit flowing
from IP laws, we could short circuit our analysis. We would
conclude that the benefits generated by IP are—relative to the
absence of IP—less than or equal to zero, meaning we need not
consider the costs of IP at all to find it unjustified. Evidence that
the incentive thesis is true in some circumstances but not in
others defeats this strategy in part: A consequentialist must
consider the social costs of IP rights in at least those
circumstances where they generate creative activity, and
somehow attempt to compare those costs to the value of that
activity. In such circumstances, the hypothesis we really care
about—and should be attempting to test against alternative
hypotheses using the criterion of falsification—is that the
benefits of IP are greater than its costs. A Popperian welfarist
interested in justifying IP rights—or their elimination—would
thus need, at a minimum, empirical evidence on both costs and
benefits.
But before we even reach that point, a deeper problem
remains: there may be other benefits to IP laws that a costbenefit analysis would need to take into account, besides the
generation of creative outputs. We can begin to understand the
nature and scope of this problem by considering the value of
creative work to creators themselves. For example, Rebecca
Tushnet argues that many people deeply enjoy engaging in
creative work: they feel motivated to create and derive personal
satisfaction and fulfillment from doing so, independent of any
pecuniary compensation.26 Relatedly, Professor Merges places

26
See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace
Assumptions, 51 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 513, 526–527 (2009).
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particular weight on the autonomy of creative professionals who
are able to earn a living from their creative efforts under an IP
regime.27 Both of these phenomena—the fact that creators derive
personal satisfaction from the process of creation itself and the
fact that creators can enjoy material security while pursuing
such personally fulfilling activities according to their own
wishes—would seem to be relevant to an assessment of a legal
regime that purports to channel and regulate creative activity by
reference to the benefits that flow from such activity. But both
authors argue that the phenomena they identify simply cannot
be properly accounted for in a consequentialist framework.28
I think it is an overstatement to claim that a
consequentialism premised on cost-benefit analysis can’t account
for these features of creative work. However, attempting to do so
reveals an essential incompleteness in consequentialist
justifications for regulation of complex social phenomena, such as
innovation and creativity, and exposes serious limitations on the
power of empirical methods in evaluating such justifications.
This is principally because such cost-benefit analysis requires
costs and benefits to be quantified in ways that allow them to be
measured and compared to one another, and the process of doing
so is beset with contestable value judgments. The pitfalls of
attempting such quantification and comparison are frequently
cited in critiques of cost-benefit analysis as it applies to health
and safety regulations,29 but they are equally relevant to
evaluation of IP.

27

MERGES, supra note 19, at 195–236.
Id. at 112 (“[E]ven if the special incentive of an IP right leads to a somewhat
unequal distribution of resources . . . the right may be justified. It may enable
someone to pursue her most cherished career goal, and to do so independently. The
freedom to do this might well be worth the loss of some social value that would be
provided if the creator worked for less money, or under less autonomous
conditions.”); Tushnet, supra note 26, at 521–22 (“Creativity, as lived, is more than a
response to incentives, working from fixed and random preferences.”).
29
Compare Cass R. Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical Life: Some
Clarifications and Puzzles, 4(2) J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 237, 238–39 (2013)
(suggesting ways of incorporating critiques of quantification into cost-benefit
analysis), with FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (arguing that many
goods—particularly environmental goods—are not subject to the quantification that
cost-benefit analysis requires).
28
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We need not resort to life-and-death stakes to show how
value judgments creep into any cost-benefit analysis of IP law.
Take, for example, the autonomy enjoyed by a creative
professional who is able to earn a living from her creative work,
and the satisfaction she derives from doing so. What is the value
of her autonomy or her satisfaction? How might we measure it?
Should we try to quantify it in dollars? Can we? Is her income
itself a proper measure? Should we instead try to identify some
alternative, more remunerative labor she might engage in, and
treat the difference between her imputed foregone income from
that labor and the income flowing from exercise of IP rights as
the “value” of her autonomy? If so, how? Do we know what
alternative labor she would have engaged in, or what the
imputed income from it would be if we cannot observe either
directly in the real world? Should we instead ask her to put a
dollar value on her autonomy or on the satisfaction she derives
from creative work? If she did so, should we take her estimate at
face value? Could we treat her answer as useful data?
And what if the creative autonomy in question is not that of
a rights-holder, but of a user—the “amateur” of Professor
Merges’s discussion, or the fanfiction authors of Professor
Tushnet’s analysis? If stronger IP rights prevent these users
from incorporating existing copyrighted works into their own
creative endeavors, should we consider that a cost of those
rights? Again, how would we measure that cost? How can we
know what works are not getting created because a would-be
creator is unable or unwilling to secure a license on terms
demanded by a prior creator?30 How could we put a value on
those uncreated works, even if we knew what they were?31
When we do turn to questions of life and death, these
fundamental uncertainties become even more unsettling. What
is the aggregate social benefit of a cure for a rare disease that
kills ten people per year? What about the benefit of a marginally
improved treatment for a superficial health condition, like mildly
itchy skin, that affects millions of people per year? Can we

30

See Carrier, supra note 12, at 950; see supra text accompanying note 12.
I raised similar questions in an earlier comment on the debate between
Professors Lemley and Merges. See Jeremy Sheff, Faith-Based vs. Value-Based IP:
(Apr.
2,
2015),
On
the
Lemley-Merges
Debate,
JEREMYSHEFF.COM
https://jeremysheff.com/2015/04/02/faith-based-vs-value-based-ip-on-the-lemleymerges-debate.
31
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measure these benefits in dollars? If so, how many millions of
people with mosquito bites are equivalent to ten victims of a
deadly disease? For that matter, how many works of fanfiction
would we be willing to give up to eradicate such a disease? To
more effectively relieve the mild itching of ten million people?32
And here is perhaps the most difficult question of all: if we
did ask the terminally ill, the mildly itchy, the creative
professionals, and the fan-fiction authors of our examples to put
a dollar value on these costs and benefits of their lived
experiences, and they all gave us different answers, which
answer should we plug in to our cost-benefit analysis? Should it
matter whether the difference in their answers is influenced by
their heterogeneous pre-existing levels of wealth or income over
which they have no control?33 Should we simply average their
answers together, and if so, should we weigh the components of
our average? Should anybody else have a say? If so, who?
Answering all these questions requires us to make value
judgments—about the value of freedom to develop one’s
expressive capacities, about what level of material support a
member of society deserves in exchange for a technological or
cultural contribution, about our collective obligations to the sick
and the needy, about the allocation of control over cultural
development between the last generation and the next one, about
how to balance respect for individuals with wariness about bias
and self-interest. These values are not readily amenable to
academic quantification.34
Specialized training in law,
economics, or empirical methods does not confer any privileged
position in answering these questions.35 My value judgments are
32
These questions implicate deeper philosophical questions about the
transitivity of value and its aggregation. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND
PERSONS 381–90 (1984) (laying out the famous “repugnant conclusion” as a
challenge to welfarist normative systems that rely on aggregation); LARRY S.
TEMKIN, RETHINKING THE GOOD: MORAL IDEALS AND THE NATURE OF PRACTICAL
REASONING 134–39 (2012) (using an example comparing degrees of pain ranging
from torture to mosquito bites over gradually extending periods of time to dispute
the transitivity of the “better than” relation in evaluative judgments).
33
See generally James K. Hammitt & Lisa A. Robinson, The Income Elasticity of
the Value per Statistical Life: Transferring Estimates Between High and Low Income
Populations, 2 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1 (2011).
34
Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 779, 842 (1994).
35
To be sure, cost-benefit analysis methodologies are usually explicitly laid out
and defended against critiques, and this transparency is laudable and important—
perhaps the most important feature of such analyses. See, e.g., id. at 843 (“[I]f goods
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no better than those of the average person on the street—though
of course I may believe they are. The problem here is not merely
the familiar dilemma that philosophers refer to as
“incommensurability”36—that we are trying to compare apples
and oranges—or dollars and lives—when there is no single
acceptable metric or ordinal relation by which to compare them.
Nor is it only the tenuousness of the transitivity and aggregation
conditions that are assumed in cost-benefit analysis.37 The
deeper problem is that whether something is best thought of as
an apple or an orange may depend on who is holding it—or
looking at it—at any particular moment. Under these conditions,
nearly all the work of cost-benefit analysis is contained in the act
of deciding what gets measured, and how. Thus, the implicit

are diverse and valued in different ways, there will be considerable crudeness in
[cost-benefit analysis of] regulation. . . . We should therefore have a presumption in
favor of a much more disaggregated accounting of the effects of regulation, one that
exposes to public view the full set of effects.”). And yes, individual preferences
revealed in real-world transactions or survey responses can provide some indirect
evidence of how people weigh tradeoffs between control over their current stock of
material resources and their goals for an uncertain future, and we can construct
plausible models by which we can try to derive from those shadows and reflections of
individual values a comprehensive set of population-wide preferences. See generally,
e.g., Jacob Goldin & Daniel Reck, Preference Identification Under Inconsistent Choice
(June 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2417709. But
even doing this requires the analyst to make contestable assumptions—for example,
that a society’s collective decision as to how to distribute and marshal its finite
resources ought to be a function of atomized individual decisions that specific people
make under—often arbitrarily heterogeneous—individual budgetary or cognitive
constraints. As another of our panelists, Amy Kapczynski, has argued elsewhere, if
the existing distribution of those constraints offends our values, a regulatory
framework that assumes such a distribution may be similarly offensive. Amy
Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How To Get Beyond Intellectual Property
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 996 (2012) (“IP rations access via the price
mechanism, and so it distributes resources in a way that is sensitive to the
background allocation of resources. Yet the background allocation of resources may
be unjust.”). This is equally true of a mode of analysis that assumes such a
distribution—even where the assumption is simply a result of the limits of the
methodology itself. For example, attempting to derive a society’s preferences from
individual preferences—whether revealed in transactions or measured in some other
way—may simply be an example of the “drunkard’s search” or “streetlight problem”
endemic to empirical research methods: we measure what we can observe, even if it
is not what matters. DAVID H. FREEDMAN, WRONG: WHY EXPERTS* KEEP FAILING
US—AND HOW TO KNOW WHEN NOT TO TRUST THEM 40–46 (2010); ABRAHAM
KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 11 (1973).
36
See generally INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL
REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Sunstein, supra note 34.
37
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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answer to this most fundamental question in cost-benefit
analysis—who settles disputes over the definition and
measurement of value—is that the analyst decides.
To my mind, the most salient objection to empirical analysis
of the consequentialist justification for IP is not that “it’s
complicated”38—though it is that. Rather, the most serious
problem is that such analysis is not an act of observation, but an
assertion of power. It is the act of deciding what counts, how to
count it, and how to compare it to other sources and measures of
value. Of course, resort to the authority of dead white male
philosophers and their well-considered ideas of what is right and
good is no less an act of power than the specification of a model
for cost-benefit analysis. In both cases, the analyst’s conclusions
rest on the privileging of a set of values embedded in the
assumptions underlying their mode of analysis. My point is not
that either consequentialism or deontology is true or false; it is
that people—incredibly smart people!—legitimately disagree on
that question, as they disagree on what conclusions should be
drawn from either mode of reasoning.
The fact of that
disagreement ought to be taken seriously.
So what does this type of disagreement imply for the conduct
of scholars studying IP? This Symposium was convened to try to
start answering that question. The title of the Symposium—
“Values, Questions, and Methods”—was selected to reflect the
issues scholars must face as the value judgments underlying our
assessments of our object of study are increasingly forced to the
surface.
First: Values. If the value judgments underlying our
assumptions are really what drive the outcome of our analyses
and define the stakes of our debates, then perhaps burying those
value judgments in the methodology section of a cost-benefit
analysis or the citations of a philosophical exegesis is not the best
way to proceed. Perhaps we ought to direct our arguments to our
value judgments themselves. For example, Professor Merges’s
analysis reveals a default preference for the interests of
creators;39 Professor Lemley’s analysis reveals a default
preference for the interests of consumers, or at least for market-

38

Lemley, supra note 16, at 1343.
MERGES, supra note 19, at 196 (“[C]reative professionals ought to be a special
object of interest for IP law and policy.”).
39
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based allocations—however we might define those.40 If these
default preferences are what really drives their disagreement, let
us debate their merits directly. And let us be sure to include in
that conversation as broad and diverse an array of values as
might be brought to bear on the assessment of IP. In this
Symposium Issue, for example, Jan Osei-Tutu argues that we
ought to value human development as an independent good and
incorporate it into our priorities for an IP system, raising the
question how such a value can be integrated into the more
familiar values that have traditionally been invoked in
assessment and justification of IP laws.41
Ann Bartow’s
discussion of how IP law as implemented seems to systematically
disfavor women requires us to confront the extent to which we
value gender equity and what we are willing to do in pursuit of
that value.42 These examples show just how broad an array of
normative commitments might be implicated by the design of our
IP laws.
Of course, it may be that we simply have irreconcilable
differences of opinion regarding what we think is important, or
how weighty we think each of our values is relative to the other.
In such a case, neither academic debate nor even empirical
evidence is likely to resolve the impasse. Our disagreement then
becomes a question of politics, in the nonpejorative sense of
organizing competing individual priorities into a plan of
coordinated social action. Such fundamental differences may
ultimately have to be resolved through an appropriate social
choice mechanism—hopefully a democratic one—in which legal
academics have no particular claim to precedence. But in
discussing our normative commitments openly, we may find that
in fact we have a great deal in common, and that we can identify

40
Lemley, supra note 16, at 1330–31 (“IP rights represent government
interventions in the marketplace that seek to achieve that desirable social end by
restricting the freedom of some people (consumers, reusers, critics) to do what they
want with their own real and personal property in order to improve the lives of other
people (inventors and creators). . . . In a market-based economy, regulation requires
some cost-benefit justification before we accept it.”).
41
See generally J. Janewa Osei-Tutu, Human Development as an Intellectual
Property Metric, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 711 (2016).
42
See generally Ann Bartow, Patent Law, Copyright Law, and the Girl Germs
Effect, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 579 (2016).
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our areas of agreement and narrow and sharpen our
disagreements in such a way as to identify targets for further
research, discussion, and knowledge building.
This leads to the second heading of our Symposium:
Questions. If indeed people make different value judgments in
assessing IP systems, one obvious question is what those
judgments are. While legal academics can—and should—lay out
our own value judgments in our scholarship, we are not
representative of the public at large. As Greg Mandel shows in
his contribution to this Symposium, most laypeople have quite
skewed beliefs about the content of IP law, and implicitly about
what IP law ought to do.43 If reconciling competing priorities is a
social choice problem to be tackled by democratic institutions, the
divergence between lay and expert priorities for IP should
engender some additional humility on the part of the legal
academy.44
Now, assuming we know what we want from our IP system,
what questions should a scholar of that system investigate? I
have already cast some doubt on the ultimate cost-benefit
question—whether the benefits of IP exceed its costs. But that
doubt arises from the absence of agreed truth conditions for that
question—a problem for the Popperian model under which we
have been laboring. But we can still inquire meaningfully into
the causal relationships between IP laws and human behaviors,
and about observable and quantifiable costs and benefits arising
from those behaviors, so long as we are mindful that the answers
to such questions will always be incomplete. Nevertheless, even
an incomplete answer may be a helpful input into the process of
practical reasoning whereby our knowledge and our values are
integrated to produce a course of action. For example, Oskar
Liivak has argued that consequentialists should not be focusing
on incentivizing innovation at all; that what we should really
care about is providing a framework for transactions between
creators and commercializers.45 Under this view, we should
prioritize scholarly investigation of how law interacts with
commercialization, rather than with knowledge creation.
43
See generally Gregory N. Mandel, What Is IP For? Experiments in Lay and
Expert Perceptions, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 659 (2016).
44
Id.
45
See generally Oskar Liivak, Stop Rewarding: The Pathologies of Inducing
Inventions, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 639 (2016).
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Another set of questions might ask whether IP is serving our
priorities effectively. Funmi Arewa’s contribution, for example,
investigates the interface between the law of copyright and the
traditions and lived experience of musicians to see whether the
law is sufficiently accommodating of the creative community it
purports to serve.46 We could ask similar questions about any
community that interacts with the IP system—on the producer
side or the consumer side.
Once we have a set of questions we want answered, we must
figure out how to go about answering them. This is the subject of
our Symposium’s final heading: Methods. Our panelists offer a
wide array of methodological approaches. On the empirical side,
we see tremendous diversity, from the experimental studies of
Professors Buccafusco, Fromer, and Sprigman to the qualitative
empirical methods pioneered by Jessica Silbey and the
comparative analysis and case study methods championed by
Brett Frischmann.47 This richness of empirical scholarship is
consistent with the maturation of the empirical turn described
earlier. Irene Calboli’s discussion of the benefits of comparative
legal research offers a more traditional methodological approach,
one that is perhaps neglected in the current scholarly
And of course, we have considerable
environment.48
methodological diversity in papers discussed earlier: the
theoretical approaches from Professors Bartow, Lemley, Liivak,
and Merges; and the anthropological approach of Professor
Arewa, for example. If there is one thing missing from this
panel, it is traditional doctrinal scholarship—an omission that is
perhaps understandable in a Symposium that was convened
specifically to reflect on scholarship rather than on doctrinal
developments.
Mapping these diverse methodologies to scholarly questions
is not necessarily an easy task. For all the rich variety and
sophistication of empirical methods available, I hope I have
convinced my readers they are not well suited to the ends to
which they have traditionally been put: proving or disproving

46
See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright and Cognition: Musical
Practice and Music Perception, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 565 (2016).
47
See Panel 3, supra note 9.
48
Irene Calboli, Value, Questions, and Methods in Intellectual Property: A Call
for Strengthening the Role of Comparative Legal Analysis in the United States, 90
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 609 (2016).
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that IP rights are a good thing. But they have tremendous value
on important questions short of this ultimate value-laden
question. Empirical research may not be helpful in telling us
what we should want. But it can be very good at telling us
whether we are getting what we want, so long as we identify
what we want with precision and it can be observed in the real
world. When we have two clearly defined and observable states
of the world and are measuring the difference in one inherently
quantitative variable between those two worlds, empirical
research can be quite helpful. The most obvious scenario is when
we define a target for particular outputs of our regulatory
system—say, a reduction in emissions of a certain pollutant, or
an increase in the catalog of digital music files available for legal
streaming—and try to determine whether we are meeting our
goals or not.
Moreover, empirical methods are tremendously useful for the
purpose of informing us what is actually happening in the world
at its points of interaction with the IP system. Whether it is
documenting the experiences of affected communities or probing
the inner workings of courts and agencies, such research provides
a rich understanding of how the actual functioning of IP laws
may differ in nonintuitive ways from what we might predict.
Of course, a fast-moving field like IP will always have a place
for traditional doctrinal scholarship. But the type of theoretical
scholarship that has long dominated IP—divided as it is between
law-and-economics consequentialism and Lockean deontology—
has begun to degenerate in ways that are troubling. It may be
that these two camps are hardened and irreconcilable, and their
differences can only be resolved outside the academy. But I hold
out hope that a recognition of the value judgments underlying
these two schools of thought, and a frank discussion of these
values—informed, perhaps, by more current literatures from
allied fields, such as philosophy and the various social sciences—
may spark a rejuvenation of IP theory and open up new areas for
productive inquiry by IP scholars.

